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1 Introduction 
 
The micro-finance movement is growing at a dizzying pace. The number of the poorest 
micro-finance clients worldwide, for example, increased from 7.6 million in 1997, to 66.6 
million in 2004 (Micro-credit Summit Report, 2005).1 In India, even in the aftermath of the 
global financial crisis, the number of outstanding accounts increased from 61.2 million in 
2007-08, to 76.6 million in 2008-09 (Srinivasan, 2005). 
This rapid expansion, however, has given rise to new issues and concerns. With 
increased micro-finance penetration, many countries are witnessing an increase in competition 
among micro-finance institutions (henceforth MFIs), with many areas being served by 
multiple MFIs. In the context of Bangladesh, for example, the Wall Street Journal 
(27.11.2001) reports that “Surveys have estimated that 23% to 43% of families borrowing 
from microlenders in Tangail borrow from more than one.”2 Even in India, the Southern states 
are witnessing lots of competition among MFIs, with reports of increasing MFI competition 
in the North and the East as well (Srinivasan, 2009).3 
This increase in competition can be problematic on several grounds. One of the 
central concerns, and the one we focus on in this paper, has to do with the impact of increased 
competition on borrower targeting. For example, Olivares-Polanco (2005) finds that 
competition worsens poverty outreach in a cross-sectional study of 28 Latin American MFIs. 
Rhyne and Christen (1999) also report that increased MFI competition has worsened 
outreach. They mention that typically while the poorest clients would need loans of $300, 
Paraguayan microfinanciers were lending $1,200 and targeting the not so poor. Out of a 
sample of 17 Latin American MFIs, only 2 served very poor clients.4 On the other hand, 
Nagarajan (2001) finds that the spurt in competition between MFIs in the Central Asian and 
Eastern European countries has actually improved targeting of the poor, particularly in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. She mentions that the increase in such competition in Bosnia spurred two 
                                                 
1 Even around 2000, there were around 8-10 million households under similar lending programs all 
across the world (Ghatak, 2005), including countries in Latin America, Africa, Asia and even the 
United States of America (see Morduch, 1999).  
2 McIntosh and Wydick (2005) provide evidence of increased MFI competition from Uganda and 
Kenya in East Africa, and Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua in Central America. 
3 In the Indian state of Karnataka, for example, there were 7.31 million micro-finance accounts by the 
end of 2009 (SOS, 2009). Even assuming all the poor were covered, this comes to 2.63 accounts per 
household. The number would be higher if one takes into account that the loans generally go to women 
and the very poor are typically not covered (Srinivasan, 2009). 
4 Kai (2009) conducts a panel study on 450 motivated MFIs in 71 countries, and finds that competition 
worsens outreach. However, he does not of course control for variables like inequality and technology. 
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major MFIs, Prizma and Mikra, to move “downmarket” and make the decision to specialize 
in very poor rural clients. While the empirical evidence is mixed, it does suggest that 
competition may worsen borrower targeting in some cases. 
Another area of concern is the presence of double-dipping, i.e. borrowers taking loans 
from several MFIs. A survey by the Grameen Koota staff covering 200 borrowers (including 
105 defaulters), suggests that 25 per cent of these borrowers had taken loans from 6 or more 
MFIs. In another extreme example, one woman was found to have borrowed Rs. 4 million 
from different MFIs (Srinivasan, 2009). Other empirical studies (for example, McIntosh, de 
Janvry and Sadoulet, 2005) confirm the importance of double-dipping. It is of course clear 
that such multiple lending can weaken repayment discipline, with the borrowers using loans 
from one MFI to repay another (see, e.g., Srinivasan, 2009). Here we examine a somewhat 
less obvious implication of double-dipping, namely the effect on borrower targeting. 
In this paper we examine the effects of increased MFI competition, focussing on its 
implications for borrower targeting, both in the presence and in the absence of double-
dipping. We find that borrower targeting depends in a subtle way on the interaction of several 
factors, borrower inequality, the extent of competition, the nature of the technology and the 
possibility of double-dipping. While, in the absence of double-dipping, competition worsens 
borrower targeting, it turns out that double-dipping may encourage the MFIs to give loans to 
the poor, rather than the rich. Further, in the presence of double-dipping, MFI coordination 
may worsen borrower targeting. Also, in case increased MFI competition is accompanied by 
mission drift by newer entrants, then such competition may be accompanied by a contagion 
effect, whereby even motivated MFIs may switch to richer borrowers. 
We analyze this issue in a very simple framework that nevertheless has several 
aspects that are in tune with reality, namely the MFIs being motivated as well as informed 
(regarding borrower characteristics), and the possibility of double-dipping (i.e. a single 
borrower accessing loans from multiple MFIs). 
We model the MFIs as motivated agents5 that maximize the aggregate utility of the 
borrowers. That many NGOs (including MFIs) are motivated is well known in the literature. 
The United Nations Interagency Committee on Integrated Rural Development for Asia and 
the Pacific (1992) (henceforth UNICIRDAP) for example, defines NGOs as organizations 
with six key features: they are voluntary, non-profit, service and development oriented, 
autonomous, highly motivated and committed, and operate under some form of formal 
                                                 
5 According to Besley and Ghatak (2005) motivated agents are those ``who pursue goals because they 
perceive intrinsic benefits from doing so''. They provide examples of such agents that include doctors, 
researchers, judges and soldiers. 
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registration.6 Thus our approach is complementary to McIntosh and Wydick (2005) and 
Navajas et al. (2003) where the MFIs are taken to be largely client-maximizing. 
In our framework, the MFIs also have greater information regarding the borrowers, in 
particular their income levels. This is because of the closeness of MFIs to their clientele, 
something the donors, including the government, may not have. In fact, it is one of the central 
themes of the micro-finance literature on peer monitoring, as well as assortative matching that 
MFIs have greater information as compared to formal sector lenders (see, e.g. Bannerjee et al. 
(1994), Ghatak (2000), Roy Chowdhury (2005, 2007), etc). 
We consider a framework with two kinds of borrowers, poor and not-so-poor, with 
the poor having no savings, and the not-so-poor (henceforth rich for expositional reasons) 
having a positive savings of w. All borrowers have access to a project each, which however 
requires a start up capital of one unit to run it at the efficient level. Since none of the 
borrowers have that much capital, they have to borrow the shortfall from some MFI. The 
MFIs in their turn access the money from some donor, who decides how much to advance to 
each MFI and the interest rate to be charged from the borrowers.   
The benchmark model has a single MFI accessing one unit of capital from the donor. 
Interestingly, the analysis shows that even motivated MFIs need not select a poor borrower.7 
There are several effects at play here. On the one hand, since the rich borrowers have an 
outside option, this tends to make the net increase in utility higher in case the loan goes to a 
poor borrower. On the other hand, rich borrowers have to pay back relatively less, since they 
have their own capital to partially fund the project. In addition, if the rich really only have a 
small amount of wealth, their outside option may simply be to let their wealth lie idle, instead 
of implementing an inefficiently small project. This in turn makes lending to the rich 
borrower more attractive, as his outside option is relatively small.  We find that when 
inequality is small, that is, the rich are not very rich, then the last two effects dominate, so that 
the microfinance lender is more likely to lend to a rich borrower. For high levels of 
inequality, or when the technology is not too convex, however, the poorest borrowers are 
more likely to get loans unless the rate of interest is very high.  
Interestingly, this is in line with evidence that MFIs often target those with a small, 
but positive level of wealth, rather than the poorest of the poor. Morduch (1999) and Rabbani 
et al. (2006), for example, emphasize the difficulty that the ultra-poor face in accessing 
microfinance. Rahman (2003) provides data that less than 49% of microfinance clients in 
                                                 
6 UNICIRDAP (1992) also says that “the rural poor are given higher priority by NGOs” (page 20) as 
compared to governments.  
7 Aubert, de Janvry and Sadoulet (2009) model a situation where a MFI may want to lend to poor 
borrowers but cannot due to agency problems involving non-motivated credit agents. Our results 
however obtain even without any such agency problems. This point is discussed in more detail in a 
later section. 
 5
Bangladesh are actually very poor.8 According to Nagarajan (2001), out of over 100 NGO 
MFIs in the region of Central Asia, less than 12% actually targeted the poorest.9  
We then turn to the effect of competition among the MFIs, with competition being 
modelled as two MFIs receiving half units of capital each. Interestingly, we find that the 
effects of competition depend on a subtle interaction of several factors, namely the level of 
inequality, the nature of technology, as well as whether double dipping is possible or not.  
We first consider the case where the MFIs have information regarding the borrowing 
patterns of the borrowers, so that double-dipping can be prevented. In contrast to the case 
with a single MFI however, in this case the outcome necessarily involves lending to the rich 
borrowers. The intuition follows from the fact that both the poor and the rich will be using up 
the loan fully. Consequently, the rich stand to gain more given the convexity of the 
technology. In spite of effects that work in the opposite direction – such as the fact that rich 
borrowers have an outside option, unlike the poor - the first effect dominates, so that the MFIs 
prefer to lend to the rich, rather than the poor. This suggests that whenever inequality10 is 
relatively large (and the rate of interest is low), an increase in MFI competition can lead to the 
rich being targeted, thus hurting the poor borrowers.  
This shows that one possible negative implication of MFI competition, at least in the 
absence of double-dipping possibilities, is worsening of borrower targeting. This adds to the 
literature which demonstrates other possible negative implications of MFI competition, e.g. a 
decrease in the ability to cross-subsidize the poor (McIntosh and Wydick, 2005), mission drift 
(Aldashev and Verdier, 2010), worsening of information flows (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1998), etc. 
We then examine the case with double-dipping. Interestingly, it turns out that double-
dipping may encourage the MFI to give loans to the poor, rather than the rich. The intuition is 
that in the presence of double dipping, once a poor borrower obtains a loan, giving a second 
loan to the same poor borrower increases his utility surplus by more compared to giving it to 
another poor borrower, or one of the rich borrowers. This follows from the convexity of the 
technology since once a poor borrower obtains a loan, he has access to more capital compared 
to the other borrowers. Given that the literature generally views double-dipping as something 
of a problem, this result identifies a potentially positive aspect of double-dipping. 
 
                                                 
8 Defined as below the poverty line. 
9 In fact, the Indian MFI Bandhan has a special programme to target the ultra poor. Arguably the need 
for such programmes suggests that the very poor do not generally get access to microfinance – an 
impression confirmed by Basu and Srivastava (2005) who find that outreach of Indian MFIs has 
remained modest in terms of the proportion of very poor households reached. 
 
10 We sometimes use the phrase “intra-poor inequality” interchangeably with “inequality”. This should 
be understood as inequality among the “poor” and “rich” borrowers in our model, since our “rich” 
borrowers actually have only a small level of wealth (neither MFIs nor donors have any interest in 
lending to those who are really rich, so really rich borrowers do not enter our model). 
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Further, in the presence of double-dipping we find that there may be multiple 
equilibria where the loan goes to the rich, rather than the poor. We find that as long as 
inequality is either small, or large but not too large, there is an equilibrium involving double-
dipping by the rich borrowers. For intermediate and very high levels of inequality, however, 
there is an equilibrium where the loan goes to the rich, but the outcome may, or may not 
involve double-dipping. 
We obtain some interesting results in case, with competition, the new MFIs suffer 
from mission drift, in that they maximize the utility of the not-so-poor borrowers. In this case 
not only does the newer entrant lend to the richer borrowers, but there is a contagion effect in 
that even the motivated MFIs will lend to the richer borrowers. 
One interesting implication of this multiplicity involves the effects of coordination. 
Given the possibility of double-dipping, one of the responses has been to argue for greater 
coordination among the MFIs. In the Indian context, for example, Srinivasan (2009) argues in 
favour of such coordination.11We find however that such coordination may, in fact, have 
adverse effects for targeting, and may lead to coordination on the equilibria where the loan 
goes to the rich, rather than the poor. 
One broad conclusion emerging out of the analysis is that the effect of competition on 
targeting seems to worsen with inequality, though for small levels of inequality competition 
can actually improve targeting of the poor whenever double-dipping is possible. Thus one of 
the main contributions of this paper is to highlight the importance of inequality, as well as the 
nature of technology, for analyzing MFI competition. 
In this context it is of interest to re-visit the studies by Morduch (1999), Rabbani et al. 
(2006), Rahman (2003) and Nagarajan (2001), discussed earlier. Though none of these studies 
mention inequality (or technology) as possible explanatory variables, we observe that Bosnia 
and Herzegovina – for which Nagarajan (2001) found that competition improves targeting – 
has a low Gini coefficient of 26, while Latin American countries, for which others have found 
that competition worsens targeting, have very high Gini coefficients (for example, 58.4 for 
Paraguay, 60 for Bolivia).12 It is clear that these facts are consistent with our results on how 
inequality enters into the relationship between competition and targeting, though we do not 
claim that ours is the only explanation for these mixed empirical findings. 
We then briefly relate our paper to the small, though growing theoretical literature on 
MFI/NGO competition. Aldashev and Verdier (2010) examine a model of NGO competition, 
where the NGOs allocate their time between working on the project and fundraising. 
Interestingly they find that if the market size is fixed and there is free entry of NGOs, then the 
                                                 
11 In Kolar, Karnataka, India for example, Srinivasan (2009) shows that such increased coordination 
has followed increased competition and default by borrowers. 
12 Gini coefficient data are from the Human Development Report 2007-08, UNDP. 
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equilibrium number of NGOs can be larger or smaller than the socially optimal one. While 
such mission drift is of undoubted interest, for the sake of focus in our paper we abstract from 
the issue of endogenous allocation of funds, assuming instead that competition simply reduces 
the amounts available to all MFIs. 
McIntosh and Wydick (2005), as well as Navajas, Conning and Gonzalez-Vega 
(2003) have a model where a client-maximizing incumbent MFI competes with a profit-
oriented entrant.13 McIntosh and Wydick (2005) show that non-profits cross-subsidize within 
their pool of borrowers. Thus when competition eliminates rents on profitable borrowers, it is 
likely to yield a new equilibrium in which poor borrowers are worse off. Our paper however 
differs from both these papers in several respects. Not only do we abstract from the issue of 
cross-subsidization, our analysis adopts a motivated, rather than a client-maximizing MFI. 
This captures the increase in socially motivated MFIs, for instance in countries like 
Bangladesh and India (Harper, 2005, documents the fast growth of such “Grameen 
replicators” in India). We demonstrate that even if both competing MFIs are motivated, 
competition will still have significant effects. For example, depending on whether double-
dipping is feasible or not, competition may, or may not adversely affect borrower targeting.    
Traditionally an increase in MFI competition is presumed to increase overall 
borrower indebtedness, usually through double dipping (as in McIntosh and Wydick 2002 
where competition without information sharing raises indebtedness). In our model, however, 
competition does not increase the overall funds available to borrowers (it merely induces the 
donor to split his funds among a greater number of competing MFIs) therefore though we 
consider double dipping, competition need not increase indebtedness. Interestingly enough, 
McIntosh, de Janvry and Sadoulet (2005) find no effect of competition on average loan size, 
in spite of multiple loan taking. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the economic 
framework, while Section 3 considers the case with a single MFI. Sections 4 and 5 examine 
the effect of MFI competition, Section 4 in the absence of double-dipping, and Section 5 in 
the presence of double dipping. Section 6 has some concluding discussions, while some of the 
proofs are collected together in the Appendix. 
                                                 
13 In a related paper, Hoff and Stiglitz (1998) examine a model where there is competition between 
informal moneylenders, and examine the effect of credit subsidy on the outcome. They show that 
subsidy may trigger entry, which in turn may worsen repayment performance because of scale effects, 
lower information flows, etc. 
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2. The Framework 
 
The framework comprises three classes of agents, the borrowers, one or more MFIs, and a 
donor. The borrowers are of two types – poor, and not-so-poor (denoted the rich). Poor 
borrowers have no wealth, whereas rich borrowers all have a positive wealth level of w. 
While there are other, richer borrowers, neither the MFIs, nor the donors, both of 
whom are motivated, are interested in lending to them. We formalise the fact that the 
rich are really not-so-poor by assuming that w is small, to be precise 0<w<1/2. Further, all 
borrowers are risk neutral, so that that they maximize their expected income. 
All borrowers have access to one project each, where the project size is endogenous 
and depends on the scale of investment I, where I takes values in [0,1].  We will consider a 
project technology with both a linear and a convex component, so that an investment of I in 
the project yields a gross return of f(I) = yI2+ xI.  
We interpret an increase in the convexity of the technology, formalized as an increase 
in y with an equal decrease in x, as a shift to more capital-intensive technologies. The idea is 
that with more capital-intensive technologies, complementarities among the various 
components become more critical, leading to an increase in convexity. Thus this framework 
allows us to examine the effects of an increase in capital intensity of the available 
technologies on MFI competition and borrower targeting.14 
We shall maintain the following assumption throughout the analysis: 
 
Assumption 1.  (a) 1x y+ > , (b) 0 1x< < , and (c) 2(1 )y x> − .  
 
Note that Assumption 1(a) guarantees that the efficient outcome involves implementing a 
project of size 1.15 Assumptions 1(b) and 1(c) jointly guarantee that there is a threshold level 
of wealth w*, 0<w*<1/2, such that in the absence of a loan, a rich borrower invests in the 
project provided w>w*. Otherwise he simply lets his wealth w lie idle. To see this, let w* 
satisfy f(w*)=w*. Solving, we obtain w*=(1-x)/y. Now assumption 1(b) guarantees w*>0, 
while assumption 1(c) guarantees w*<1/2. 
Given the project technology, even rich borrowers cannot implement the project at its 
efficient scale, unless they borrow, although they can undertake a less efficient project at 
                                                 
14 Sen (1962) also examines the issue of choice of techniques, though in a different context. 
15 This follows since the net project return, yI2+xI-I is convex, decreasing at I=0, and is increasing and 
positive at I=1. 
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scale w. The poor cannot implement any kind of project unless they get a loan, as they have 
no personal wealth. Thus the borrowers must approach the MFIs in case they want a loan. 
There are one or more MFIs, who are motivated non-profit organizations. The fact 
that they are motivated is reflected in the facts that (a) they only care about the poor, and the 
not-so-poor, and not about the richer borrowers, and (b) their objective is to maximize the 
aggregate expected utility of the poor and the not-so-poor borrowers. Recall from the 
introduction, that in this respect the present paper differs from McIntosh and Wydick (2005), 
as well as Navajas et al (2003) who assume client-maximizing MFIs. 
The MFIs however have no funds of their own, and obtain funding from a donor. The 
donor maximizes a weighted sum of aggregate utility of the poor, and not-so-poor. We 
formalize this by assuming that the donor has a weight of 1 on the aggregate utility of the 
rich, and a weight of p on the aggregate utility of the poor. We assume that p≥1, so as to 
capture the fact that the donor may be more pro-poor compared to the MFI. This, for example, 
may make sense in the current Indian context whenever the donor is the government, given 
the government’s emphasis on inclusive growth. This may also be true for foreign donors: 
according to Aubert, de Janvry and Sadoulet (2009), bilateral donors like the USAID have 
become increasingly concerned about MFIs’ “mission drift”, leading to the U.S Congress 
passing the “Microenterprises Self-Reliance Act” in 2000 which required half of all USAID 
microenterprise funds to benefit the very poor. 
The donor selects the interest rate r, where r is the gross interest (inclusive of the 
principal). We assume that the donor has an opportunity cost of zero for the capital, therefore 
we must have r≥1. In order to focus on the interesting case where the efficient scale is 
potentially implementable, we also assume that r≤x+y. The donor has funds of 1, which it 
gives to the MFI.  
The MFI(s) then choose a borrower to lend the amount they have accessed from the 
donor. We assume that the MFI observes borrower type and knows who is poor, and who is 
not – a realistic assumption given that micro-finance lenders operate at a grass-roots level and 
have extensive knowledge of their clients’ living conditions. Moreover, the donor does not 
know the borrower type and hence cannot directly ensure whether the MFI lends to the poor, 
or not. Moreover, this information regarding the identity of the borrowers is soft, so that the 
donors cannot condition the contracts on the identity of the borrowers. Further, it is 
prohibitively costly for the donor to lend the money directly to the borrowers, so that it must 
rely on the MFIs as intermediaries in this process. 
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3. No Competition Among MFIs: A Single MFI 
 
We begin by considering the baseline model where there is a single MFI. In this case the 
donor gives the whole of the one unit capital to this MFI, who then selects whether to lend 
this amount to a rich, or a poor borrower.  
  As the MFI is motivated, its objective is to maximize the aggregate utility of 
the borrowers through its loan. Which type of borrower will it target? It turns out that 
this is influenced by the level of inequality and also by the extent of convexity of the 
production technology.  
Begin by considering a loan to a poor borrower. Note that a poor borrower’s outside 
option without a loan is 0 as he has no wealth. Therefore the net (utility) surplus generated by 
lending 1 unit to a poor borrower is 
 
( ) 0S P x y r= + − >                                                                                                        (1)                                        
 
Next consider a loan to a rich borrower. Recall that for a rich borrower his outside option is 
f(w) if w>w*, it is w otherwise. In either event, as the rich borrower already has a wealth of 
w, the MFI, if it lends to him, only needs to loan him 1-w. If the MFI lent him more than this, 
he would leave some of his own wealth un-utilized, which would be inefficient. Thus the MFI 
lends him 1-w: we assume that the unused part of the MFI’s fund is remitted back to the 
donor.16 Thus the surplus generated by lending to a rich borrower is 
 
2( ) (1 ), *S R x y yw xw r w w w= + − − − − ∀ > , 
          (1 )y x w r w= + − − −               *w w∀ <                                                          (2)           
Now if w<w*, we have 
 
( ) ( ) ( 1) ( )S R S P w r S P= + − ≥ ,        (given r≥1).                                                      (3) 
 
Thus, if w is low enough, that is, the “rich” borrowers are not too rich, then even a so-called 
motivated MFI may prefer to target the not-so-poor, rather than the poor.17 The intuition is 
that if the rich borrower’s own wealth is small enough, implementing a project in the absence 
                                                 
16 This is an innocuous assumption once we realize that in reality a MFI divides its funds among a huge 
number of borrowers instead of just having enough funds for one client. In that context, our assumption 
would be equivalent to ruling out complications caused by integer constraints. 
17 Of course, the MFI puts equal weight on the poor, and the not-so-poor. However, qualitatively 
similar results should go through whenever the weight put by the MFIs on the poor is greater than that 
on the not-so-poor. 
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of a loan may not be an option for him, as he loses economies of scale. Given that his outside 
option is not very large, the surplus from giving him a loan is significant, especially as he 
only has to pay back interest on 1-w, instead of interest on the whole 1 unit in case the loan 
was made to a poor borrower. 
What if w>w*? This corresponds to a case where even the not-so-poor have a 
significant amount of wealth, so that intra-poor inequality is large. In this case, we have 
 
( ) ( ) ( )S R S P w yw x r= − + −                                                                                               (4) 
 
Here, the optimal targeting policy depends on the level of r. If the interest rate is not too large, 
so that r<yw+x, the motivated MFI would lend to the poor borrower. The fact that the rich 
borrower can implement a project of size w even without a loan, while a poor borrower 
cannot, tends to increase the surplus from lending to a poor borrower, while the fact that the 
rich borrower only has to pay back interest on 1-w instead of 1 tends to raise the surplus from 
lending to a rich borrower. The first factor dominates unless r is very large. However, if the 
interest rate is very high, so that r>yw+x, the motivated MFI would lend to the rich borrower 
instead. 
We then examine if the nature of the technology, in particular the convexity of f(I) 
affects the analysis. An increase in convexity is modelled as an increase in y, balanced by an 
equal decrease in x. It is straightforward to check that such a change increases w*. Recalling 
that w*=(1-x)/y, and that x+y>1, we have that 
 
2
[ 0]
* 1 1 0
dy dx
dw x
dy y y
=− >
−
= − > . 
 
Therefore, a more convex technology makes it more likely that w<w*, that is, the MFI will 
lend to a rich rather than to a poor borrower. (We can also check that such a change reduces 
x+yw so that it becomes less likely that r<x+yw – which would make it more likely that a rich 
borrower is targeted even when w>w*). We may summarize the discussion up to now in 
Proposition 1. 
 
Proposition 1. Suppose that there is a single motivated MFI.  
(a) The MFI will target a rich borrower when inequality among the poor is low, i.e. w<w*.  
(b) When inequality among the poor is high, i.e. w>w*, the MFI will target a poor borrower 
if and only if the rate of interest is low, i.e. r<yw+x. 
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(c) When the production technology gets more convex, the MFI becomes more likely to target 
a rich rather than a poor borrower. 
 
Interestingly, Proposition 1 is in line with evidence that MFIs often target those with a small 
but positive level of wealth, rather than the poorest of the poor. As discussed in the 
introduction, Morduch (1999), Rabbani et al. (2006), Rahman (2003) and Nagarajan (2001), 
all obtain results broadly supporting this claim. Aubert et al (2009) also discuss mission drift 
among “pro-poor” MFIs. However, in their model, unlike ours, this occurs due to the actions 
of “credit agents” who are not themselves motivated. In our paper, in contrast, the MFIs may 
not target the poorest in spite of being motivated and in spite of being in a position to identify 
the poorest. Moreover, Proposition 1 shows that this is likely to be the case whenever the 
level of intra-poor inequality is not too large (or when inequality is large but the rate of 
interest is high), and the technology is relatively capital intensive, i.e. convex. 
 
3.1 The Donor’s Problem 
 
Given that the donor cannot observe borrower types, the donor can only control the gross rate 
of interest r that the MFI must charge from the borrower. What is the optimal r for the donor? 
We find that optimally the donor sets r=1, and the loan goes to the poor unless w<w*. 
          Recall that the donor maximizes a weighted sum of the aggregate utility of the 
poor, and the not-so-poor. To begin with let us consider the case where the objectives 
of the MFIs and the donor are completely aligned, so that p=1. Note that the aggregate 
utility is decreasing in r, so that optimally the donor sets r=1. Next suppose that the 
donor objective is biased towards the extreme poor, i.e. p>1. Note that reducing r to 
the lowest possible value, i.e. r=1, not only increases the utility of the borrowers, but, 
from Proposition 1, also helps in targeting the poor. Thus, in the absence of 
competition, the donor always sets r=1. This ensures that the loan goes to the poor 
unless w<w*, (note that for w>w*, yw+x>1 so the loan always goes to the poor in this 
case). 
 
4. MFI Competition in the Absence of Double-dipping 
 
Next, we will look at the effects of introducing competition between MFIs, formalized as two 
identical MFIs competing for the donor’s funds. We consider a scenario where the donor 
splits his funds equally among these two, giving each ½. How will this affect targeting?  
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In this section we focus on the case where each borrower can borrow from at most 
one MFI. Note that this involves two implicit assumptions, first, that the MFIs have 
information regarding whether the borrowers are double-dipping or not, and second, that they 
want to prevent double-dipping. Regarding the informational assumption, this is likely to be 
the scenario whenever the MFIs work so closely with the borrowers that they get to know not 
only the income level of the borrowers, but also their financial transactions. This would also 
occur in case the MFIs share the credit-history of the borrowers among one another, 
something that has often been recommended given the increase in MFI competition in recent 
years.18,19 As regarding the second assumption, this is not innocuous. As we argue in the next 
section there may be scenarios where the MFIs may prefer to allow double-dipping. Thus the 
implicit assumption here is that because of the regulatory scenario, the MFIs avoid double-
dipping. In the Indian state of Karnataka, for example, efforts are on to create a regulatory 
framework for MFIs with the explicit objective of preventing double-dipping (Srinivasan, 
2009).20 
For concreteness, let there be two poor borrowers, P1 and P2, and two rich borrowers, 
R1 and R2.21 We consider the following two-stage game: 
 
Stage 1.  The borrowers simultaneously decide which of the MFIs to apply to. Further, they 
are free to apply to both the MFIs, or neither of them.  
 
Stage 2. The MFIs simultaneously decide which of these borrowers to lend to, and how much 
to lend to the selected borrower. 
 
           As is usual, we use a backwards induction argument (subgame perfection) to solve for 
the equilibrium outcome. Turning to the solution, in this case an individual borrower would 
be able to get a loan of only ½. Consequently, a rich borrower would be able to implement a 
project of scale w+1/2, while a poor borrower would only be able to implement a project of 
scale ½. We now ask whether an individual motivated MFI has an incentive to lend to a rich, 
or a poor borrower. 
                                                 
18 For example, Rhyne and Christen (1999) suggest that information sharing among MFIs in the form 
of credit bureaus is becoming increasingly necessary as the market for microfinance matures. 
19 Of course, recent years have also witnessed the phenomenon of double-dipping, where a single 
borrower accesses loan from more than one MFI. We shall allow for this phenomenon in the next 
section. 
20 Alternatively, one can think that social norms, as well as the MFIs reputational concerns imply that 
they try to distribute the loan among as many borrowers as possible. 
21 Thus, there are two MFIs serving four borrowers, so that we are essentially modelling a situation 
where the MFI competition is really dense.  
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From an individual MFI’s perspective, the net utility surplus from lending ½ to a poor 
borrower is 
 
1 1( , ) ( )
2 2 2 4 2 2
r y x rS P f= − = + − ,                                                                                (5) 
 
as this poor borrower would also have to pay back interest on a loan size of only ½. 
If the MFI lends to a rich borrower, this rich borrower can now implement a project 
of size w+1/2. Without the loan he would have implemented a project of size w if w>w*, and 
would have let his wealth lie idle otherwise. Thus the net utility surplus generated by lending 
½ to a rich borrower is 
 
1 1( , ) ( ) ( )
2 2 2
rS R f w f w= + − − ,                                               *w w∀ >  
              = 2
1 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) , *
2 2 2 2 2
r rf w w x w y w w w w+ − − = + + + − − ∀ < .               (6)          
 
Note that  
 
*
1 1( , ) ( , )
2 2w w
S R S P> > ,  
 
as f(w+1/2) >f(w) + f(1/2) for any convex f(.). Thus when intra-poor inequality is large, i.e. 
w>w*, the MFI targets a rich borrower.  
What about the case where w<w*, so that intra-poor inequality is low? In this case, 
from (5) and (6), 
 
1 1( , ) ( , ) (1 ) [ (1 ) 1] 0
2 2
S R S P yw w xw w w y w x− = + + − = + + − >  
 
given that x+y>1. Therefore, even when w<w*, an individual motivated MFI targets a rich 
borrower in the presence of competition. This is in sharp contrast to the case without 
competition, where, for w>w*, the single motivated MFI would target a poor borrower unless 
r was very high. 
The intuition for this contrast is the following. With competition, a rich and a poor 
client alike would use up the whole loan of ½. This would enable a poor client to start a 
project of scale ½, but would enable a rich one to expand his project scale from w to w+1/2, 
 15
which, given convexity, represents a greater increase in productivity. Without competition, 
this effect was absent because while a poor client would get a loan of 1, a rich one would only 
need a loan of 1-w. Both types would end up with the same project size of 1. 
Summarizing the preceding discussion we have Proposition 2. 
 
Proposition 2. Let there be two MFIs, each obtaining ½ units of capital. In the absence of 
double-dipping, the MFIs lend to the not-so-poor borrowers. 
 
Combining Propositions 1 and 2, we have our next corollary which is the central result of this 
section. 
 
Corollary 1. In case double-dipping is not feasible, encouraging competition between MFIs 
hurts the poor when inequality is not too low (w>w*) and r is not too high (r<yw+x). 
Otherwise, the loan goes to the not-so-poor irrespective of whether there is competition, or 
not. 
 
Proof. From Proposition 1, we know that in the absence of MFI competition, the single MFI 
targets the poor borrower when  w>w* and r<yw+x. However, when there are two motivated 
MFIs and double-dipping is ruled out, these MFIs always target rich borrowers– thus hurting 
the poor. For other values of w and r, a rich borrower is targeted regardless of whether there is 
one motivated MFI or two, so competition neither helps nor hurts poor borrowers. QED. 
 
Remark 1 We then examine the effect of an increase in the convexity of the technology. With 
increasing convexity, as w* increases and yw+x falls, the range over which competition is 
harmful to the poor shrinks. This is in tune with, and essentially follows from part (c) of 
Proposition 1. 
 
4.1 The Donor’s Problem 
 
From Proposition 2, under competition the loan always goes to the rich borrower. Thus the 
donor cannot affect borrower targeting through manipulating r. Thus under competition, the 
donor should set r=1, which maximizes borrower utility, as well as the donor’s objective.   
Next, turning to the question of whether the donor should encourage competition or not, 
in the absence of double-dipping it turns out that restricting competition is always optimal for 
the donor as long as intra-poor inequality is not too low. In that case the donor can always set 
r=1 to ensure that the poor are targeted, further this maximizes the donor’s objective.  
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Otherwise, however, the loan necessarily goes to the rich. In this case, depending on the 
parameter values, the donor may, or may not encourage competition. 
 
5. MFI Competition in the Presence of Double-dipping 
 
In this section we consider the case where the MFIs cannot know (barring voluntary 
disclosure by borrowers) whether a borrower approaching it has already taken a loan from 
another MFI or not. Such a scenario is especially likely if the MFIs do not share the credit-
history of the borrowers among themselves. In that case double-dipping is a possibility that 
the MFIs and the donor must take into account. In fact, as our discussion in the introduction 
shows, double-dipping is quite prevalent in many cases. 
Let us consider the possibilities with double-dipping. If a poor borrower double dips, 
he can implement a project of size 1 by taking two loans of ½ from both MFIs. He would also 
have to pay interest on the total amount borrowed of 1. If a rich borrower double dips, then 
the scenario depends on whether he wants to hide the fact that he is double-dipping from the 
MFIs or not. Ideally, he would like to borrow ½ from one MFI and ½-w from the second.22 
This would enable him to reach the efficient project size of 1 and he would have to pay back 
interest on the total amount borrowed of 1-w. As in the case with one motivated MFI, the 
unused part of the second MFI’s funds (amounting to w) would be remitted to the donor. If, 
however, the rich borrower wishes to conceal from the MFIs that he is double dipping (as 
might happen if they would not lend to him if they knew he was), he may have to borrow the 
same amounts from each MFI – ½ each – as he would if he were just borrowing from one of 
them. However, after implementing a project of size 1, he could then return the unused 
portion of the loan (by which time it is too late for the MFI to prevent him from double 
dipping).  
We consider a game form that is similar to that considered in the last section. Further, 
we allow for conditional contracts in that an MFI can say that it is going to lend to a borrower 
if and only if this borrower also has a loan from another MFI. We shall show that under 
certain situations, such contracts may actually be used by the MFIs. 
Proposition 3 below is the central result in this section, and shows that irrespective of 
the level of inequality, there exists an equilibrium where the loan goes to the poor. 
Proposition 3, coupled with Proposition 1 has some interesting implications for targeting. 
From Proposition 1 we find that it is possible that, for w<w*, while the loan goes to the rich 
in the absence of competition, under competition with the possibility of double-dipping, the 
loan may go the poor. This is interesting given that the literature has generally argued that 
                                                 
22 In fact, all that matters is that he would like to borrow 1-w in the aggregate. 
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double-dipping has negative implications for repayment performance. Our analysis shows that 
these argument needs to be qualified by the possibly positive effect of double-dipping on 
competition. 
 
Proposition 3. Let there be MFI competition with the possibility of double-dipping. Both the 
MFIs lending to the same poor borrower (allowing him to double dip) can be sustained as a 
Nash equilibrium. 
 
While the formal proof can be found in the Appendix, here we briefly discuss the intuition. 
Consider a situation where one of the poor borrowers has already obtained a loan of ½. Given 
that the other poor borrower has no savings, and even the savings of the rich are less than ½, 
making a further loan to this poor borrower leads to a greater increase in the net utility since, 
given convexity, this borrower starts with a higher baseline savings. 
We next examine the effects of an increase in the convexity of the project technology. 
Recall that if the project technology becomes more convex, then w* rises. Thus a more 
convex technology increases the range for which competition may help the poor (provided 
double dipping is feasible). The intuition is as follows. If there is just one MFI, we have seen 
that a more convex technology makes it more likely that a loan is given to a rich, rather than a 
poor, borrower. If there is competition and double dipping is feasible, however, there is 
always an equilibrium where the loan goes to the poor. 
5.1 Multiple Equilibria and MFI Coordination 
 
We must now examine whether any other Nash equilibria can exist. We find that there always 
exist equilibria where the loan go to the rich. Interestingly, however, depending on the level 
of inequality, the equilibria are qualitatively different.  
 
We begin by introducing some notations that we require in Proposition 4 below. Let  
2 2(2 ) (2 ) 2
2
y x r y x r y
w
y
− + − + + − +
= ,  
2 2(2 2 1 ) (2 2 1 ) 4
'
4
y x r y x r y
w
y
− + − − + + − − +
= , and 
2 22 (2 ) 2
~
2
y r x y r x y
w
y
+ − − + − −
=  
It is straightforward to show that w’<w*< w<w~. 
 
 18
 
Let us classify intra-poor inequality as small (w<w’), medium (w’<w<w*), large 
(w*<w<w) and very large (w<w). We find that whenever intra-poor inequality is either small 
or large, the equilibrium involves double-dipping by the rich, as well as the rich borrowers 
revealing to the MFIs that they are double-dipping.23 Further, over this range the MFIs prefer 
an outcome with double-dipping by the rich, to one where the loan goes to the poor, but there 
is no double-dipping. When the inequality is either medium, or very large, then there is an 
equilibrium where the loans go to the rich, but there may, or may not be double-dipping. In 
this zone the MFIs would like to prevent double-dipping, but they have no mechanism for 
doing so, so that in equilibrium both the rich borrowers approach both the MFI, and the MFIs 
randomise between them. 
 
Proposition 4. There are equilibria that involve lending to the rich.  
(a) Double-dipping by the rich borrowers can be sustained as an equilibrium 
whenever either 0<w<w', or w*<w<w. 
(b) For w’<w<w* and w>w, there is an equilibrium where both rich borrowers 
apply to both MFIs, and the outcome may, or may not involve double-
dipping. 
 
The detailed proof can be found in the appendix. 
 
The intuition for multiple equilibria is as follows. Consider a situation where one of 
the rich borrowers, say R1, has already obtained a loan. Given the convexity of the 
technology, making a loan to the other rich borrower dominates making a loan to the poor 
borrowers.  There are two ranges of w, w<w*, and w>w*.  Within both these ranges, lending 
to R1 (i.e. allowing double-dipping) is the preferred option whenever w is relatively small, i.e. 
either w<w’ when w<w*, and w<w if w>w*.  In this case lending to a rich borrower who 
already has another loan is more attractive, compared to another rich borrower whose wealth 
level is low.24 
Otherwise, the MFIs would prefer to prevent double-dipping. The only factor which 
might discourage double dipping, however, is that if rich borrowers do not double dip they 
only have to pay interest on a loan amount of ½, while if they do double dip they have to pay 
                                                 
23 Swaminathan, 2009, in fact suggests that it is unlikely that the MFIs are ignorant as to whether 
double-dipping is going on or not. 
24 Essentially the MFI computes whether one project of scale 1 is more or less efficient than 2 projects 
of scale w+1/2 – a calculation whose outcome depends on the level of w. 
 19
interest on a larger amount of 1-w.25 As we show however this is not going to prevent rich 
borrowers from double-dipping. Thus the equilibria here involves both rich borrowers 
approaching both MFIs, and there being randomisation by the MFIs in allotment of loans. In 
equilibrium there may be double-dipping even though the MFIs do not prefer it. 
Given that there are multiple equilibria, one natural question is whether coordination 
among the MFIs can improve matters. This is of interest given that in response to increased 
competition and double-dipping, there have been arguments in favour of increased 
coordination among the MFIs. We examine the following question: In case the MFIs can 
coordinate on which equilibrium to select, then what is the impact on borrower targeting? 
While one aspect of such MFI coordination is information sharing on credit-history seems 
hard to implement in reality, perhaps for fear of client-poaching, ignoring such information 
sharing is perhaps not too unrealistic. 
Interestingly enough, the result turns out to be just the opposite. In the presence of 
coordination we find that for 0<w<w*, the MFIs coordinate on the equilibria with lending to 
the rich. Even for w<w<w~, the loans go the rich in the presence of double-dipping and 
coordination. Comparing the results with that without competition (Proposition 1), we find 
that targeting is adversely affected by competition whenever the intra-poor inequality is at a 
relatively high level, i.e.  w<w<w~. Otherwise, competition has no effect on targeting. 
 
Proposition 5. When double dipping is feasible, if MFIs always co-ordinate on the 
equilibrium that maximizes aggregate borrower utility, they lend to the poor and permit 
double dipping either if inequality is moderate (w*<w<w) or very high (w>w~), as long as 
r<x+yw. They lend to the rich for other ranges of w, and double dipping may occur, whether 
or not this is desired by the MFIs. 
 
We see that with competition between MFIs, targeting differs depending on whether 
or not the laws and information environment are such as to make double dipping 
feasible or infeasible. If double dipping is infeasible, rich borrowers are always 
targeted when two motivated MFIs are competing for a donor’s funds. However, if 
double dipping is feasible, this effect is mitigated as an equilibrium where the MFIs 
lend to poor borrowers always exists. Even with co-ordination, for certain levels of 
inequality (either moderate or very high levels), the MFIs will lend to poor borrowers 
unless r is very high. Intuitively, when the poor double dip, there can only be an 
efficiency gain as one project of scale 1 is always more efficient than 2 projects of 
                                                 
25 Recall that the MFIs cannot force a borrower who has originally borrowed 1 but not utilized the 
whole loan to pay interest on the unutilized portion (he may return it without paying interest). 
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scale ½, due to the convexity of the technology. However, if the rich double dip, there 
need not be an efficiency gain, as 1 project of scale 1 is not necessarily more efficient 
than 2 projects of scale w+1/2. Therefore, the possibility of double dipping increases 
the relative attractiveness of lending to the poor, as opposed to lending to the rich. 
Interestingly, while double dipping has always been treated as a negative phenomenon 
in the literature, this unearths a positive effect of double dipping. 
 
Propositions 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 have been summarized in a diagrammatic form in 
Figures 1 and 2 for the sake of easy comparison. 
 
5.2 The Donor’s problem 
 
The donor’s problem is a complex one in case double-dipping is feasible and there is 
competition. In the absence of coordination, note that borrower targeting does not depend on 
r. Thus in this case the donor should optimally set r=1. 
Next suppose that MFI coordination is feasible.  
 
Proposition 6. When double dipping is feasible and there is borrower coordination, a donor 
who wants the poor to be targeted should discourage competition (give all his funds to one 
MFI) when inequality is moderately high (w<w<w~). Competition policy will not matter for 
other ranges of inequality. 
 
Proof. As w>w*, we recall that in the single MFI case a poor borrower would have been 
targeted for the range w<w<w~. However, with competition, when double dipping is feasible 
the MFIs choose to lend to rich borrowers (who may double dip) for this range of w. Thus 
competition is harmful in this range. For other ranges of w, targeting would be the same as in 
the single MFI case. QED 
 From the analysis in the previous two sections, we may infer that a donor who puts a 
very large weight on the very poor (with p tending to infinity) would like to discourage 
competition whenever inequality is not too low (w>w*) for the reason that in this range, the 
loan would always go to the poor with one MFI, while with two, there is some chance that it 
might not. Of course, in reality there may be multiple donors so actually being able to 
determine the extent of MFI competition may not be up to a single donor. 
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6 Discussion and Conclusion 
 
We begin by briefly discussing some robustness issues. 
 
                 Production function. While for computational purposes we have adopted a 
specific production function, our analysis is robust to alternative specifications. As the 
intuitive discussions throughout the paper show, the qualitative results essentially depends on 
the fact that the production function is convex up to a point, after which the productivity falls 
off sharply. Our results should go through qualitatively for all production functions satisfying 
these properties. 
 
                  Mission drift and contagion. The present paper analyses a scenario where 
competition does not lead to mission drift in the sense of the new MFIs being less motivated. 
Let us briefly consider a case where there are two MFIs, but the second MFI is less motivated 
in that it places no weight on the poor borrowers, and only cares about the aggregate utility of 
the not-so-poor borrowers. Suppose there is double-dipping. Clearly the second MFI will 
choose the not-so-poor borrower. Interestingly, this creates a contagion effect whereby the 
first MFI, who is motivated, prefers to lend to the not-so-poor borrower also. Thus 
competition with mission drift may worsen borrower targeting by motivated MFIs also. 
 
              Client-maximizing MFIs. While the case of client-maximizing MFIs is beyond the 
scope of the present paper, given the literature, we briefly consider the case where the MFIs 
are client-maximizing. Clearly, the case of interest is when double-dipping is feasible. It is 
immediately clear that Proposition 4 is dramatically altered. In this case for all parameter 
values there are equilibria where the rich borrowers approach both the MFIs, and the MFIs 
randomise between these borrowers. Further, the equilibria with double-dipping to the rich 
borrowers with probability one, cannot be sustained. We further conjecture that in this case 
the equilibria with lending to the poor borrowers with double-dipping (as discussed in 
Proposition 3), cannot be sustained. This shows that our assumption, that the MFIs are 
welfare maximizing rather than client-maximizing, does make a difference to the results. 
 
                   To summarise, this paper examines one of the emerging issues in micro-finance, 
the effect of MFI competition. We seek to extend the literature by analysing the case where 
the MFIs are motivated, as well as focusing on the issue of borrower targeting. In consonance 
with the empirical evidence, we find that depending on the extent of inequality, as well as the 
nature of the technology, the MFIs may, or may not give loans to the very poor. We show that 
MFI competition may have an adverse impact in terms of borrower targeting. In the presence 
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of double-dipping however, MFI competition may improve targeting, an effect so far not 
analysed in the literature. Moreover, our analysis identifies conditions under which MFI 
coordination may worsen borrower targeting. 
 
                                
7 Appendix 
 
Proof of Proposition 3.  First note that a poor borrower always has an incentive to double dip. 
If he borrows from only one MFI, his payoff is f(1/2)-r/2, while if he double dips his payoff is 
f(1)-r. While he pays back twice the interest, the output he gets from his project rises faster as 
f(1) is greater than 2f(1/2), given the convexity of f(.).  
Given that one MFI is lending 1/2 to a poor client, the second MFI has three choices: 
lending to the same poor client, allowing him to double dip (a strategy we label P1), lending 
to a different poor client (P2) and lending to a rich client (R1). Note that the second MFI will 
be able to distinguish between P1 and P2 as the double dipping poor client will always reveal 
that he has double dipped (he has no incentive to conceal it, because as we will show, MFIs 
are always willing to allow the poor to double dip). While choosing its optimal strategy, the 
second MFI will consider the total payoff of (rich and poor) borrowers generated by each of 
its strategies. First, we look at these payoffs when w>w*: 
1: (1) ( )P f r f w− +  
12 : 2 ( ) ( )
2
P f r f w− +  
1 11: ( ) ( )
2 2
R f w f r+ + −  
Given the convexity of f(.), P2 is strictly dominated by P1. Substituting f(I) = xI+yI2, we see 
that P1 dominates R1 iff 
2 2 21 1( ) ( ) ( )
2 2 2 2
x yy x yw xw y w x w+ + + > + + + + +  
or ½>w, which is always true. Thus, for w>w*, clearly (P1,P1) is a Nash equilibrium. For 
w<w*, the outside option of the rich borrower is to let his wealth lie idle, rather than 
implement a project of size w, and we have 
1: (1)P f r w− +  
12 : 2 ( )
2
P f r w− +  
1 11: ( ) ( )
2 2
R f w f r+ + −  
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Again, P1 dominates P2 given the convexity of f(.). P1 dominates R1 iff 
2 21 1( ) ( ) ( )
2 2 2 2
x yy x w y w x w+ + > + + + + +  
or 
1(1 ) [ (1 ) ]
2
w x y w w− > + −                                                                                                 (7) 
Note that the derivative of the LHS of inequality (7) with respect to w is 1-x while the 
derivative of the RHS with respect to w is y(1+2w)>y>1-x given our assumption that x+y>1. 
Therefore, the RHS increases faster in w than the LHS. Hence, if inequality (7) holds at the 
highest possible value of w, here w=w*=(1-x)/y, inequality (7) will also hold for all values of 
w between 0 and w*. At w*, the LHS has the value   [(1-x) 2]/y  while the RHS has the value 
1-x + [(1-x) 2]/y – y/2. Simplifying, the LHS thus exceeds the RHS iff 
y/2 > 1-x 
or y>2(1-x) which always holds by our assumption that w*<1/2. Thus, (7) holds for all values 
of w between 0 and w*: hence P1 dominates R1. Therefore, (P1,P1) is also a Nash 
equilibrium for all values of w<w*. Combining this with our earlier result, a Nash equilibrium 
where both MFIs lend to the same poor borrower, allowing him to double dip, exists for all 
values of w. QED. 
 
Proof of Proposition 4.  First note that the second MFI will be able to distinguish between 
lending to the same rich borrower, allowing him to double dip (R1), and lending to a different 
rich borrower (R2), only if the double dipping rich borrower voluntarily reveals that he is 
double dipping. The borrower, in turn, will only do this if (a) he has an incentive to double 
dip, and (b) he knows that MFIs prefer (R1) to (R2), that is, they want to encourage double 
dipping by rich borrowers. Condition (a) translates into 
1(1) (1 ) ( )
2 2
rf r w f w− − > + −  
or 
(1) ( 1/ 2)
1/ 2
f f wr
w
− +
<
−
                                                                                                    (8) 
We recall that r must always be less than f(1) for the project to be efficient. Now we can show 
that f(1) is always less than the RHS of inequality (8). The condition for f(1) to be less than 
this RHS boils down to 
( 1/ 2) (1)
1/ 2
f w f
w
+
<
+
 
or 
1( )
2
x y w x y+ + < +  
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which is always true given w+1/2 is less than 1. Therefore, as r is less than f(1), and f(1) is 
less than the RHS of (8), we infer that (8) must always hold. Rich borrowers always have an 
incentive to double dip. 
 To evaluate condition (b), note that MFI’s preferences between R1 and R2 are 
determined by looking at the total payoffs (of the two rich borrowers) from each strategy. 
First, consider w>w*: 
1: (1) ( ) (1 )R f f w r w+ − −  
12 : 2 ( )
2
R f w r+ −  
Under R1, the double dipping rich borrower can implement the optimal project, and only has 
to pay interest on 1-w, while the second rich borrower must use his own personal wealth to 
implement a smaller project. Under R2, two different rich borrowers would each borrow ½ 
and start projects of size w+1/2. We can show that there is a cutoff 
2 2(2 ) (2 ) 2
2
y x r y x r y
w
y
− + − + + − +
= , such that R1 is preferred for w<w, while R2 is 
preferred for w>w. 
If w<w*, the logic is similar except that f(w) in the expression for R1 is replaced by 
w: if the first rich borrower double dips, the second must now let his wealth lie idle. Similar 
to the w>w* case, we can find a different threshold, w’, where 
2 2(2 2 1 ) (2 2 1 ) 4
'
4
y x r y x r y
w
y
− + − − + + − − +
= , such that for w<w’, R1 is preferred by 
the MFI to R2, while for w>w’ R2 is preferred to R1. 
From the above, we conclude that MFIs will be able to distinguish between R1 and 
R2 if either w*<w<w or 0<w<w’<w* (in these ranges, rich borrowers intending to double dip 
will voluntarily reveal their borrowing patterns to MFIs, knowing that MFIs prefer them to 
double dip). First consider the case w*<w<w. If the first MFI lends to a rich borrower, the 
second now has to choose between R1, R2 and P1. Thus it compares 
1: (1) ( ) (1 )R f f w r w+ − −  
12 : 2 ( )
2
R f w r+ −  
1 11: ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
P f w f f w r+ + + −  
We see that P1 can never be a best response as it is dominated by R2, given 
f(w+1/2)>f(w)+f(1/2). We also already know that for this range of w, R1 is preferred to R2. 
Therefore, for w*<w<w, a Nash equilibrium exists where both MFIs lend to the same rich 
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borrower, allowing him to double dip: (R1,R1) is sustainable as a Nash equilibrium for w in 
this range. 
 For the case 0<w<w’<w*, the second MFI’s choices between R1, R2 and P1 will 
yield 
1: (1) (1 )R f w r w+ − −  
12 : 2 ( )
2
R f w r+ −  
1 11: ( ) ( )
2 2
P f w f w r+ + + −  
We can check that the condition for R2 to dominate P1 boils down to 
(1 ) 1y w x+ + >  
which is always true given our assumption that x+y>1. Hence P1 can never be a best response 
when the first MFI is lending to a rich borrower. Moreover we already know that for this 
range, R1 is preferred to R2. Hence for 0<w<w’<w*, there exists a Nash equilibrium where 
both MFIs lend to the same rich borrower, allowing double dipping (R1,R1). 
 We now turn to the cases w’<w<w* and w>w>w*, where the MFIs cannot 
distinguish between a double dipping rich borrower and a rich borrower who is not double 
dipping. In this case, the MFI’s choices are simply R (lending to a rich borrower) or P(lending 
to a poor borrower). Assume there are two rich borrowers and both approach both MFIs, and 
both MFIs randomize between the two rich borrowers with equal probability. First consider 
the range w’<w<w*. Given that the first MFI has picked a rich borrower, the second MFI 
estimates the expected total output (of two rich borrowers and one poor borrower) from 
lending to a rich borrower as 
1 1 1: [ (1) (1 )] [2 ( ) ]
2 2 2
R f w r w f w r+ − − + + −  
which is an average of the output from lending to a double dipping rich client and the output 
from lending to two separate rich clients. In contrast, the output from lending to a poor 
borrower, given that the first MFI has lent to a rich one, is 
1 1: ( ) ( )
2 2
P f w f w r+ + + −  
Manipulations show us that (R) exceeds (P) as long as 
1(1) 2 ( )
2
f rw f w+ > +  
which is always true as due to convexity, f(1)>2f(1/2), and r is at least 1. Therefore, the 
second MFI’s best response is R. As the analysis is exactly symmetrical for the other MFI, 
there exists a Nash equilibrium in the range w’<w<w* where both MFIs lend to rich 
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borrowers, even though they are not sure whether the borrowers are double dipping (and even 
though the MFIs dislike double dipping by rich borrowers). 
 We now consider the range w>w>w*. Again, the second MFI’s choices are between 
R and P. It estimates the output from these strategies as 
1 1 1: [ (1) ( ) (1 )] [2 ( ) ]
2 2 2
R f f w r w f w r+ − − + + −  
1 1: ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
P f w f f w r+ + + −  
The condition for R to exceed P boils down to 
1(1) 2 ( ) ( )
2
f rw f f w+ > + . 
Substituting in for f(.) and simplifying, this is equivalent to 
[ ]
2
y w x yw r> + −                                                                                                               (9) 
Note that if r>x+yw, (9) automatically holds as y is positive. If r<x+yw, note that the RHS of 
(9) is increasing in w. Therefore, if the inequality holds for w=1/2, it holds for all w. The 
condition for (9) to hold at w=1/2 becomes 
4 2
y x r−
>  
which always holds as x<r (recall that x<1, while r must be at least 1) while y is positive. 
Therefore, inequality (9) always holds, and R is the second MFI’s best response. As the MFIs 
are symmetric, there exists a Nash equilibrium for the range w>w>w*, such that both MFIs 
lend at random to rich borrowers and there may be double dipping in equilibrium even though 
this is disliked by these MFIs. 
 
QED 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 5.  When MFIs co-ordinate, they co-ordinate on the equilibrium with 
highest overall borrower welfare. To compare borrowers’ welfare in the different equilibria, 
we consider two rich and two poor borrowers. First we focus on the subset of wealth levels 
w*<w<w , comparing welfare in the two possible equilibria (P1,P1) and (R1,R1). In the first 
of these, both MFIs lend to the same poor borrower, allowing him to double dip, so he 
executes a project of size 1, and borrows 1: the two rich borrowers each get their outside 
option f(w). Hence the total welfare in this equilibrium is given by 
( 1, 1) (1) 2 ( )W P P f r f w= − +                                                                                            (10) 
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Meanwhile, in the (R1,R1) equilibrium, both MFIs would allow the same rich borrower to 
double dip. He executes a project of size 1, while only borrowing 1-w : the second rich 
borrower gets his outside option, while poor borrowers get nothing. Thus we have 
( 1, 1) (1) ( )W R R f r rw f w= − + +                                                                                     (11) 
By comparing (10) and (11), we see immediately that welfare is higher in the (P1,P1) 
equilibrium iff 
( ) ^f wr x yw r
w
< = + =                                                                                                      (12) 
Therefore, for w between w* and w, the donor can ensure that the MFIs co-ordinate on the 
(P1,P1) equilibrium rather than the (R1,R1) equilibrium. It can do this by setting r at or below 
r^ (it can easily be checked that r^ is greater than 1 for all w>w* so this is feasible). It might 
well do this given its preference that the poor be targeted. 
  
 Now consider 0<w<w’<w*, so that the candidate equilibria are (P1,P1) and (R1,R1). 
We have 
( 1, 1) (1) 2W P P f r w= − +                                                                                                  (13) 
( 1, 1) (1)W R R f r rw w= − + +                                                                                             (14) 
Given that r must be at least 1, it is easy to see that (14) exceeds (13), with equality at r = 1. 
Therefore, the MFIs will co-ordinate on the equilibrium where they lend to the same rich 
borrower, allowing him to double dip.  
 Now we consider the range w>w>w*, where the candidate equilibria are (P1,P1) and 
(R). We have 
( 1, 1) (1) 2 ( )W P P f r f w= − +                                                                                             (15)                                  
1 1 1( ) [ (1) ( ) (1 )] [2 ( ) ]
2 2 2
W R f f w r w f w r= + − − + + −                                                    (16) 
We can show that (15)>(16) if and only if r<r^ and w is greater than a threshold w~ where 
2 22 (2 ) 2
~
2
y r x y r x y
w
y
+ − − + − −
= while (16)>(15) otherwise. Therefore, the MFIs co-
ordinate on the (P1,P1) equilibrium when w>w~ and r<r^ and co-ordinate on the R 
equilibrium otherwise. By setting r<r^ (which is feasible since r^>1 for all w>w*) the donor 
can ensure co-ordination on the (P1,P1) equilibrium when w>w~. 
 Finally we examine the range w’<w<w*, where again the candidate equilibria are 
(P1,P1) and (R). We have 
( 1, 1) (1) 2W P P f r w= − +  
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1 1 1( ) [ (1) (1 )] [2 ( ) ]
2 2 2
W R f w r w f w r= + − − + + −  
The condition for W(R) to exceed W(P1,P1) boils down to 
1(1) 3 2 ( )
2
f w f w rw+ < + +                                                                                              (17) 
Note that by definition, for w in this range, the MFIs would have preferred to prevent double 
dipping by the rich, therefore we have 
12 ( ) (1)
2
f w f w rw+ > + +                                                                                                 (18) 
As r must be at least 1, we have 
(1) 3 (1) 2f w f w rw+ < + +  
              < 
12 ( )
2
f w rw+ +  (from(18)) 
Therefore, (17) holds and W(R)>W(P1,P1). For w’<w<w*, the MFIs co-ordinate on the (R) 
equilibrium.QED 
 
References 
 
Aghion, B, Morduch, J. The economics of micro-finance. The MIT Press: Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, London, England;  2005. 
Aldashev, G., Verdier, T., 2010, Goodwill bazaar and giving to development. Journal of 
Development Economics 91, 48-63. 
Aubert, C, de Janvry, A, Sadoulet, E, 2009, Designing credit agent incentives to prevent 
mission drift in pro-poor microfinance institutions. Journal of Development Economics 90, 
153-162. 
Banerjee, A., Besley, T., Guinnane, T.W., 1994. Thy neighbor's keeper: The design of a credit 
cooperative with theory and a test. Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, 491-515. 
Basu, P, Srivastava, P, 2005. Scaling-Up Microfinance for India’s Rural Poor. World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper No 3646. 
Besley, T, Ghatak, M, 1999. Public-Private partnerships for the provision of public goods: 
Theory and an application to NGOs, DEDPS ;  17; London School of Economics. 
Besley, T,  Ghatak, M, 2005. Competition and incentives with motivated agents. American 
Economic Review 95; 616 - 636. 
Daley-Harris, S, 2005. State of the microcredit summit campaign report 2005. The 
Microcredit Summit Campaign, Washington DC. 
Farrington, J, Lewis, D J.  Non-governmental Organizations and the State in Asia. London, 
Routledge; 1993. 
 29
Ghatak, M., 1999. Group lending, local information and peer selection. Journal of 
Development Economics 60, 27-50. 
Ghatak, M., 2000. Screening by the company you keep: Joint liability lending and the peer 
selection effect. Economic Journal 110, 601-631. 
Ghatak, M., Guinnane, T.W., 1999. The economics of lending with joint liability: Theory and 
practice. Journal of Development Economics 60, 195-228. 
Harper, M, 2005. ICICI Bank and Microfinance in India. Working Paper. 
Hoff, K., Stiglitz, JE, 1998. Money-lenders and bankers: price-increasing subsidies in a 
monopolistically competitive market. Journal of Development Economics 55, 485-518. 
Human Development Report 2007-08, UNDP. 
Kai, H, 2009. Competition and wide outreach of microfinance institutions. MPRA Paper no. 
17143. 
McIntosh, C., Wydick, B., 2005. Competition and Microfinance. Journal of Development 
Economics  78, 271-298. 
McIntosh, C, de Janvry, A, Sadoulet, E, 2005. How Rising Competition Among Microfinance 
Lenders Affects Incumbent Village Banks. Economic Journal 115, 987-1004. 
Morduch, J., 1999. The micro-finance promise. Journal of Economic Literature 37, 1564-
1614. 
Nagarajan, G, 2001 “Poverty Outreach”, chapter 5 in Forster, S, Greene, S, Pytkowska, J, eds 
The State of Microfinance in Central and Eastern Europe and the New Independent States, 
Microfinance Centre Project, CGAP Washington DC. 
Navajas, S, Conning, J, Gonzalez-Vega, C, 2003, Lending Technologies, Competition and 
Consolidation in the Market for Microfinance in Bolivia. Journal of International 
Development 15, 747-770. 
Rabbani, M, Prakash, Sulaiman, M, ,2006, Impact Assessment of CFPR/TUP: A Descriptive 
Analysis Based on 2002-2005 Panel Data. CFPR/TUP Working Paper Series No 12. RED, 
BRAC and Aga Khan Foundation, Canada. 
Rahman, R.I, 2003, Future Challenges Facing the MFIs of Bangladesh : Choice of Target 
Groups, Loan Sizes and Rates of Interest. Working Paper, BIDS, Dhaka. 
Rhyne, E, Christen, R.P, 1999, Microfinance Enters the Marketplace. USAID, Washington 
DC. 
Roy Chowdhury, P., 2005. Group-lending, sequential financing, lender monitoring and joint 
liability. Journal of Development Economics 77, 67-82. 
Roy Chowdhury, P., 2007. Group-lending with sequential financing, contingent renewal and 
social capital. Journal of Development Economics 84, 487-506. 
Sen, A.K, 1962. The Choice of Techniques. Oxford, Basil Blackwell. 
Srinivasan, N., 2009. Microfinance India, State of the Sector report 2009. Sage India. 
 30
United Nations Interagency Committee on Integrated Rural Development for Asia and the 
Pacific. Partners in Rural Poverty Alleviation: NGO Cooperation. United Nations, New York; 
1992. 
 
